Imported drone tech: A grave national security threat for India

By Sai Pattabiram

Technology can be both a strength and a drawback in modern warfare. The well-publicised Hezbollah Pager Attacks, in which cheap, apparently benign consumer electronics were used as weapons to bypass sophisticated security systems, strikingly revealed this reality.

In today’s fast-changing geopolitical landscape, India faces a serious threat due to its reliance on foreign drone controllers, the brains behind unmanned aerial vehicles. Such incidents highlight the serious dangers associated with the use of vulnerable imported electronics on national security as the nation moves towards broader adoption of digital technology.

COTS Electronics and the Threat of Cheap Warfare

In one of the chilling examples of how asymmetric warfare works, Israel allegedly used commercial pagers as bombs in September 2024. Since it bypassed encrypted networks and conventional signal jamming, it raised serious military and intelligence questions. It is a perfect illustration of how a seemingly inexpensive and easily obtained tool can turn into something covert and catastrophic, making it hard to detect.

Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web, which damaged Russia’s critical bomber fleet, is another example of an extreme asymmetric outcome achieved through Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) electronics.

These attacks raise crucial questions about whether governments have underestimated the threat posed by non-traditional cyber-physical exploitation and how much of COTS technology can be allowed into a country freely, especially those with dual-use capabilities, such as drones.

Imported Drone Controllers: A Major Weak Link

India’s fast-growing drone ecosystem, spanning sectors such as defence, agriculture, logistics, and disaster relief, highlights its reliance on imported controllers as a serious vulnerability. Often sourced from nations with dubious geopolitical ties, these open-source controllers, whose critical code layers are readily available on repositories like GitHub, are easily hackable and can be remotely commandeered.

These controllers are sold openly both on and offline without the need for any KYC, hence making it impossible for authorities to track and monitor their usage, thus posing a major National Security Threat.

During manufacturing, malicious code could be incorporated into drone controllers, allowing vested interests to take control, disable them in mid-air, or collect critical reconnaissance data. Without careful hardware testing and access to the source code, these backdoors are somewhat difficult to locate.

Additionally, foreign suppliers may halt exports or incorporate fail-safes into upgrades during times of geopolitical uncertainty, potentially freezing UAV fleets used for military surveillance, border security, or emergency services.

India’s Operation Sindoor experience has shed light on the potential power of Artificial Intelligence-powered, locally built drones. Many of these locally built drones faced operational challenges due to the use of the vulnerable imported drone controllers.

Weaponised Technology and National Security Gaps

Both India’s drone controller problem, Hezbollah’s pager attack and Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web reflect the growing weaponisation of COTS technology. From data centres with compromised chips to consumer drones with cybersecurity vulnerabilities, the electronics supply chain is emerging as a critical factor on modern battlefields today.

Indian policymakers are waking up to this reality, as they aim to lead in digital sovereignty and modernise their defence. Source-code control, protocol integrity, and supply chain transparency are emerging as important factors affecting national security.

India’s Opportunity to Evolve into a Global Drone Hub

To address the growing national security risks tied to foreign drone controllers and COTS electronics, India needs a comprehensive, forward-looking strategy. First, the government must mandate eSIMs and enforce strict KYC norms for all drones operating in Indian airspace. Live tracking should be built into drone operations to ensure traceability and prevent unauthorised use.

Second, the import of drone flight controllers should be moved from the Open General Licence (OGL) category to a restricted one, requiring import licences. This step would limit access to potentially compromised hardware from adversarial regions. Alongside this, imposing higher import duties on high-risk electronic components from countries that lack transparency in cybersecurity practices would act as a disincentive for low-trust supply chains.

In the defence sector, a “zero trust” procurement policy should be adopted, which assumes no hardware or software component is secure unless certified by government-designated labs such as STQC. This approach would enforce deeper scrutiny and help eliminate backdoors or embedded malicious code in imported drone systems.

Together, these initiatives can lay the foundation for a secure and scalable indigenous drone ecosystem. If implemented with vision and urgency, they can elevate India as a credible and trusted global drone hub, especially at a time when geopolitical trust in Chinese tech is declining. However, this transformation demands more than domestic substitution; it calls for a paradigm shift in how the country views digital resilience, openness, and technological trust.

Protecting India’s most critical systems becomes crucial as drones take centre stage in military, agricultural, and infrastructure projects. This goes beyond just substituting a domestic chip for a foreign one; it also involves changing our perspective on trust, openness, and digital-age resilience. If we control the ‘know why’ of drone technology, our global hub vision will take flight and soar.

The author is the Founder and Managing Director of Zuppa Geo Navigation Technologies.